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Abstract
Balancing accountability and privacy has become extremely important in cyberspace, and the Internet has evolved to be
dominated by content transmission. Several research efforts have been devoted to contributing to either accountability
or privacy protection, but none of them has managed to consider both factors in content-based networks. An efficient
solution is therefore urgently demanded by service and content providers. However, proposing such a solution is very
challenging, because the following questions need to be considered simultaneously: 1) How can the conflict between
privacy and accountability be avoided? 2) How is content identified and accountability performed based on packets
belonging to that content? 3) How can the scalability issue be alleviated on massive content accountability in large-scale
networks? To address these questions, we propose the first scalable architecture for balancing Accountability and Privacy
in large-scale Content-based Networks (APCN). In particular, an innovative method for identifying content is proposed
to effectively distinguish the content issued by different senders and from different flows, enabling the accountability of
a content based on any of its packets. Furthermore, a new idea with double-delegate (i.e., source and local delegates) is
proposed to improve the performance and alleviate the scalability issue on content accountability in large-scale networks.
Extensive NS-3 experiments with real trace are conducted to validate the efficiency of the proposed APCN. The results
demonstrate that APCN outperforms existing related solutions in terms of lower round-trip time and higher cache hit
rate under different network configurations.
Keywords: Accountability, Privacy, Content Networks, Performance Analysis.
1. Introduction
Accountability is one of the key issues that concerns
service providers (SPs) and content providers (CPs) most
where the user traffic is required to be accountable (e.g.,
obtaining the packet source address) to stop in-progress at-
tacks and prevent future harmful actions [4, 12]. In other
words, when receiving messages, the requester needs to
know who should receive sanctions when needed. However,
Internet users always attempt to hide their true identity
(e.g., source address) to protect their privacy in cyberspace
[12, 17, 47] because most popular websites collect, store
and share vast amounts of personal data regardless of the
users’ disapproval [25, 35, 50]. The current Internet allows
some legitimate anonymous usages, e.g., visiting shopping
websites, anonymous donations, secret ballots and anony-
mous reporting, owing to the support of several popular
protocols such as Tor, Crowds and Address Hiding Pro-
tocol (AHP) [43]. This anonymity conflicts with the ex-
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pectations of SPs or CPs, and, even the agreement in the
cyberspace community - “one needs to be held accountable
for one’s actions” [12].
Privacy protection and accountability are two critical
factors to ensure cybersecurity, and neither is dispensable.
However, the existing IP source address acting as both the
sender address and the return address triggers a series of
contradictions between accountability and privacy [24, 45].
How to achieve accountability and privacy in the network
has been a challenging task and has received tremendous
research efforts [3, 14, 20, 22, 23, 30]. These efforts have
focused on either accountability or privacy.
Content access is the dominant service in today’s In-
ternet. The authoritative Cisco Visual Networking Index
(VNI) [11] has recently predicted that by 2021, every sec-
ond, a million minutes of video content will cross the net-
work. To support effective and scalable content distri-
bution over the network, the current Internet is shifting
towards a content-centric mode from a traditional host-
oriented mode. The content-centric mode, e.g., peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks and content delivery networks (CDNs),
has been widely adopted by SPs or CPs for efficient file
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sharing and video transmission; this is evidenced by the
prediction that the CDN traffic will carry 71% of all In-
ternet traffic by 2021 [11]. On the other hand, the state-
of-the-art studies on the future Internet have focused on
information-centric networking (ICN), which is a clean-
slate architecture centered on content distribution, lever-
aging in-network storage for caching and introducing new
interaction models that decouple the content requesters
and senders (also known as consumers and providers in
ICN) [1, 15].
The rapid growth of the current Internet has given rise
to new requirements and challenges in balancing account-
ability and privacy, especially in networks focused on con-
tent delivery. A distinct challenge is that, with the one-to-
many communication mode widely used in content-based
networks, the same content issued by the same sender
needs to have the same identifier [1, 8]. However, this fact
is not consistent with the existing packet-based architec-
ture [39], since it was designed for one-to-one communica-
tion mode, i.e., accountability was performed based on the
information of each packet; the cost of network bandwidth
and storage will then increase significantly if applied to
content-based networks. In addition, the characteristics of
Internet traffic at the packet level are notoriously complex
and extremely variable [13, 16]. Moreover, an intolerable
verification (for accountability) delay on a packet will be
produced if the verifier is located far away from the sender.
How to protect the privacy of Internet users, while mon-
itoring their behaviours to perform accountability when
necessary is extremely important and a very challenging
task in large-scale content-based networks 1.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has been
reported to address this challenging issue. To fill in this
research gap, we propose a new scalable architecture for
balancing Accountability and Privacy in Content-based
Networks (APCN). In this regard, we aim to design an
architecture with respect to the unique characteristics of
the content and content-based networks while accommo-
dating the case of flow-based one-to-one communication
mode. The design philosophy is to reduce the storage re-
quired for verification information and improve the net-
work efficiency and scalability in large-scale content-based
networks. Since the content-based network is driven by
requesters 2 [1, 36], the proposed APCN is designed from
the requester’s point of view. In other words, the content
requesters should be protected on privacy, and punished
(on accountability) if issuing malicious requests. APCN
also accounts for the balance of accountability and privacy
for content senders. However, for public repositories (e.g.,
data centers and cache servers), the repository or its op-
1The content-based network considered in this paper is an ab-
stract network focusing on content delivery, so the proposed solution
can be applied for both the networks under a content-centric mode
and the ICN.
2The terms requester and receiver are used interchangeably in
this paper, because the receiver usually acts as the content requester
in content-based networks[8, 15].
erating company should be accountable for its data based
on some agreement, and its privacy can be protected by
hiding the true identity of the servers. This could facili-
tate the mitigation of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks on public repositories. Furthermore, this architec-
ture is designed as a protocol at the network layer because,
in many applications, security at the network layer has
many advantages over that provided in the other layers
of the protocol stack [5], e.g., content-based distribution,
access control, quality-of-service (QoS) guarantee, and se-
curity management [33, 34]. This is because the network
layer forwards packets without dealing with the payload,
and intermediate nodes can check or verify (but not mod-
ify) the packet at any hop, which results in fast detection
of malicious packets. In summary, the main contributions
of this paper are as follows:
• A new identifier, content ID (CID) is proposed to
make APCN fit for networks focusing on content de-
livery. CID can uniquely identify content through
hashing, and it can also be used in content self-
certifying. With this newly introduced flexible con-
tent identifier, the same content issued from the same
sender to different requesters would have the identi-
cal identity, and the same content issued by different
senders would have different identities. In addition,
with the proposed CID, a content can be verified
using any of its packets.
• A double-delegate paradigm with one remote dele-
gate in the source network domain and one delegate
in the local network domain is proposed in APCN to
make full use of in-network cache in content-based
networks to obtain the verification information from
a nearby delegate. In contrast to the existing work
focusing only on the protection of sender privacy,
this design allows the proposed architecture to in-
clude built-in support on the privacy protection for
both content senders and requesters. In addition,
this design is able to enhance network performance
by verifying packets via the delegate at the local net-
work, reducing the packet transmission delay, lower-
ing bandwidth consumption, and decreasing the ac-
cess burden to the original remote delegate.
• The potential security issues of the proposed APCN
architecture in real-world deployment are analysed,
and the corresponding solutions are provided and
discussed.
• A theoretical analysis of key accountability processes
of the proposed APCN is conducted through devel-
oping an elegant analytical model.
• We collect a real trace from an Internet service provider
to evaluate the effectiveness and the performance of
APCN. The performance of the proposed architec-
ture is compared with that of a packet-based archi-
tecture in terms of two key metrics, round trip time
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(RTT) and cache hit rate. The results demonstrate
that the proposed APCN has a higher efficiency in
achieving the balance of privacy and accountability
in large-scale content-based networks. The reason
for having such a high efficiency is because the ver-
ification information is generated based on content
rather than per packet in the proposed architecture;
since a verified content can be reused for future ver-
ification, the verify process can, therefore, be com-
pleted locally.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Af-
ter introducing the related work in Section 2, we provide
the problem description for this study in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 describes the design of the proposed APCN. The
details of the accountability process along with the theo-
retical analysis are shown in Section 5. We analyse the
potential security issues in the real-world deployment of
APCN in Section 6. A performance analysis is carried
out in Section 7 through extensive experiments. Finally,
Section 8 concludes this study.
2. Related Work
In this section, we provide details of the existing work
related to our study in terms of accountability and privacy
and self-certifying address.
2.1. Accountability and Privacy
Accountability and privacy are considered two impor-
tant factors for ensuring the success of the current Internet.
Several existing works have been reported to address the
problems raised by either accountability only or privacy
protection only. For example, Accountable Internet Proto-
col (AIP) [3] was the most famous solution whose primary
objective is accountability. In AIP, each host maintains
a small cache to store the hashes of very recently sent
packets. The first-hop router verified the packet by chal-
lenging the source with the hash of a packet it sent. If not
successfully verified, the packet is dropped by the router,
and a verification packet is sent to the source. When a
packet traverses the boundary of an accountability do-
main, the previous accountability domain where the pack-
ets originate must determine whether the source address
was valid. AIP can stop an attack by using the shutoff
protocol, where a victim host sends an explicit shutoff in-
struction to the host who generates such traffic.
In addition to the related work considering account-
ability only, some existing solutions addressed privacy pro-
tection only. For instance, Tor [14] is one of the most
popular projects for protecting user privacy. In its onion
routing, instead of making socket connections directly to
a responding machine, Tor makes connections through a
sequence of machines called onion routers. Onion rout-
ing allows anonymous connections for both the requester
and the sender. The Tor protocol (or Tor network) can
effectively protect user privacy. The main drawback is
very obvious in that we might never determine who is re-
sponsible for illegal behaviour. Furthermore, Lightweight
Anonymity and Privacy (LAP) [22] was another popular
contribution to privacy protection. It attempts to enhance
anonymity by obscuring the topological location of an end-
user based on two building blocks: packet-carried forward-
ing state and forwarding-state encryption. LAP allows
each packet to carry its own forwarding state, and thus, the
accountability domain can determine the next hop from
the packet instead of retaining the per-flow state locally.
In each accountability domain, a private key was used
to encrypt/decrypt forwarding information in the packet
header, preventing other accountability domains from ob-
taining the packet forwarding information. Some IPv6-
based communication, as envisioned in the Internet-of-
Things (IoT) scenarios, allows an individual host to be
multi-addressed or to change addresses over time for pri-
vacy protection [23].
Efforts were seldom made to consider the effects of both
accountability and privacy, until very recently when APIP
[39] was proposed to solve the balancing problem between
these two factors in packet-based networks under a one-
to-one communication mode. In APIP, the sender issues
a packet with an accountability delegate’s address instead
of the source address. At the same time, a message is for-
warded to the accountability delegate to notify what has
been issued by the sender. Routers (and the requesters)
along the packet transmission path can verify the received
packets by sending a verify request to the accountability
delegate. Requesters can send messages to the account-
ability delegate to report malicious behaviours if they find
the received packet was malicious or illegal.
Table 1 summarizes the differences between these var-
ious schemes and makes a comparison with the proposed
APCN architecture. Tor is an application layer tool that
can be used to protect user privacy. LAP, AIP, APIP and
the proposed APCN all work at the network layer. Among
them, LAP focuses on privacy protection, and AIP focuses
on accountability. Although APIP can balance privacy
and accountability, its implementation requires operations
on all data packets, and the third party might disclose the
user’s information. The main objective of this paper is
to provide a scalable architecture to balance accountabil-
ity and privacy in large-scale networks focusing on content
delivery (i.e., one-to-many communication). In addition,
we address the reliability and security issues of third par-
ties in this study.
2.2. Self-certifying Address
It is worth noting that, in recent years, many research
efforts have been made on new types of network addresses,
most of which emphasize self-certifying [37]; this has been
considered the trend in the development of communica-
tion networks [18, 37, 46]. The self-certifying identifiers
have been widely adopted in a variety of distributed sys-
tems. For example, in [18], self-certifying was established
by binding three different entities: Real-World Identity
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Table 1: The Comparison of Different Schemes
Scheme Layer Accountability Privacy Level
Tor [14] Application Layer Yes No Session
LAP [22] Network Layer No Yes Session
AIP [3] Network Layer No Yes Packet
APIP [39] Network Layer Yes Yes Packet
APCN Network Layer Yes Yes Content
(RWI), name, and public key. To achieve the goal of self-
certifying name in the AIP [3], the name of an object is
considered the public key or the hash of the public key
that corresponds to that object. In the NSF-funded Mo-
bilityFirst project [46], a self-certifying Globally Unique
Identifier (GUID) was derived simply as a one-way hash
of a public key, which was then used to support the au-
thentication and security throughout the project. In Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) [40], which was standardised by
the IETF, the host identifier was also derived by a fixed-
size hash of the public key.
3. Problem Description
To adapt to the trend of pervasiveness of content ac-
cess in today’s Internet, a new architecture is proposed
for balancing privacy and accountability. As introduced
in Section 1, the proposed APCN is designed as a protocol
at the network layer to address the problem of balanc-
ing accountability and privacy presenting in the current
content-based networks with one-to-many communication.
In this study, the definitions of privacy and accountability
are given below, which are consistent with many existing
studies [12, 17, 25, 28].
Definition 1. Privacy protection ensures that when users
send packets, intermediate nodes (e.g., routers) cannot de-
termine who the sender is according to the received packets.
Definition 2. Accountability means that when malicious
behaviours occur we can find the sender who should be held
responsible for this behaviour.
According to RFC 3697 [41], a network flow is a se-
quence of packets sent from a particular source (sender)
to a particular destination (receiver) that the source de-
sires to label as a flow. We follow this definition in this
study.
It is worth noting that the security of data transmis-
sion has traditionally been entrusted to key-based cryp-
tographic techniques. However, data encryption can only
protect content from being known; our work protects the
identity of the communication entity, i.e., preventing in-
termediate routers or attackers from knowing who is com-
municating.
Scenario. In this study, we consider balancing ac-
countability and privacy in a one-to-many communication
mode (transmission scenario). That is, multiple requesters
request a content, i.e., a content is sent to multiple re-
ceivers. In the following, we provide two specific scenarios
as examples.
We consider a scenario where requesters want to send
anonymous requests to obtain desired contents from the
sender which might be a CP. To protect the requester’s
privacy, the CP (possibly a sensitive site) hides the re-
quester’s real address when sending the content back to the
requester. In this process, we need to prevent malicious
anonymous accesses to the CP and also the malicious CP
(e.g., its servers are used to attack other network nodes).
Consequently, the behaviours of both the requesters and
the CP need to be checked. Considering a requester is not
located in the same accountability domain of the CP, if
other requesters request the same content from the same
domain as this requester, they can verify the validity of the
content locally (e.g., verify whether the content is from an
honest CP), without having to go to the CP’s accountabil-
ity domain for verification.
We consider another simple scenario. Today’s mobile
devices are typically equipped with integrated cameras,
enabling people to create multimedia content simply, and
thus remarkably enlarging the population of multimedia
producers. When an individual wants to send multime-
dia content to multiple people (e.g., his/her friends), we
need a new architecture that can provide more efficient
and greener services to balance accountability and privacy;
for example, generating verification information based on
content rather than flow. In other words, we only need to
generate one brief message per content, rather than gen-
erating one brief message for each receiver.
Security Assumption. We assume that the third
party (i.e., delegates) is honest-but-curious. This assump-
tion has been widely used in many related studies [10, 29,
31]. The delegate executes the task specified by the pro-
tocol but is curious about any information that may be
disclosed in this process. In addition, the delegate may be
attacked and controlled by attackers. We will provide a
method in Section 6.1 to reduce the negative effects of the
third party when it is no longer trusted or is attacked.
Threat Model. In addition to the risk of malicious
delegates, the architecture also faces a variety of security
threats. Threats may come from the sender, the verifier
(intermediate routers or the receiver), and the content re-
quester. In particular, the sender might send malicious
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Figure 1: The proposed APCN architecture with double delegates.
content to the requester or attack other network nodes.
The verifier may send a large number of invalid and mali-
cious verify requests. For example, when no corresponding
content needs to be verified, the verifier still issues a large
number of verification requests to the delegate. The re-
quester may attack other network nodes through issuing a
large number of malicious requests or sending a large num-
ber of invalid brief messages to the delegate. In addition,
intermediate nodes (e.g., routers) may steal the CID, add
it to the header of the packet, and pretend to be content
from a secure sender. The intermediate node may also
initiate a replay attack using some packets of a content
and the corresponding CID. Therefore, security threats
may appear in the brief, verify and shutoff processes. The
attack type includes DDoS attacks, flood attacks, replay
attacks, and identity theft. In the proposed architecture,
we address these threats.
4. The Proposed APCN Architecture
The meaning of IP address has become overloaded; the
source address represents too many roles in today’s Inter-
net [44]. To balance privacy and accountability, it is neces-
sary to separate the packet accountability address and the
return address originally integrated in the source address.
A recent work [39] contributed to separating these two
types of addresses in flow-based networks (i.e., one-to-one
communication mode). However, its address format (in-
cluding NID, HID and SID) is fundamentally unsuitable
for content-based networks because it can only identify a
flow, but cannot identify the same content sent by the
same sender in different flows. In addition, to achieve the
goal of scalable accountability for the contents in large-
scale networks such as the Internet, a delegate adopted
in the source domain only is insufficient and could de-
grade the network performance if the distance between
the source domain and the verifier who wants to challenge
the received packet is relatively far. In what follows, the
proposed APCN with a new address format and a newly
introduced local delegate is presented.
The proposed APCN includes the double accountabil-
ity delegates shown in Fig. 1: a source delegate (DS) in the
sender accountability domain and a local delegate (DL) in
the requester accountability domain. DS is responsible for
the senders and hides the true identity of the senders if
needed. This delegate cannot guarantee that the packet
issued by the sender is correct or non-malicious but merely
works as a third party to acknowledge whether the packet
was truly issued by the sender. Attacks from senders can
be prevented by the Shutoff() procedure (see Section 5.3).
To protect the privacy of the requesters and achieve the
goal of enhancing network performance in terms of re-
duced packet delay, lowered bandwidth consumption, and
decreased access burden to the source delegate, DL is pro-
posed in the APCN architecture. DL plays an important
role in balancing accountability and privacy for requesters,
and it caches the required information used to respond to
the requests from local verifiers.
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Figure 2: Lifecycle of the request process in the proposed APCN
architecture.
The lifecycle of the request process in APCN is shown
in Fig. 2, including the following steps:
1. The requester issues a request to the sender who has
the content, with an accountability address to pre-
vent intermediate routers along the path from know-
ing the requester source address. If required, the re-
quester source address can be masked or encrypted
in the content payload.
2. The requester sends the brief message to DL, where
the brief message is used to verify what the sender
has issued (more details on brief messaging is dis-
cussed in Section 5.1).
3. A verifier can challenge any request sent by requesters.
The sender and any intermediate routers along the
path can be the verifier. More details on the verify
process are discussed in Section 5.2. If the sender
determines that the request it received is malicious
or illegal, it can stop verifying this request by noti-
fying the delegate, and the delegate will punish the
requester if required (more details on the shutoff pro-
cess are discussed in Section 5.3).
4. If the requester allows the sender to know its true
identity, the sender can use the requester source ad-
dress, which has been masked or encrypted, in the
payload for response or connection purposes. In this
process, content producers (e.g., users who generate
the content) or CPs (e.g., date centers) can act as the
sender. Since the content has been encrypted, inter-
mediate routers still never know what the requester
requested.
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5. If the requester does not provide its true identity in
the payload, the sender responds to the request with
the requester’s accountability address (the address
of DL). After receiving the content, DL forwards
it to the requester. This approach is an alternative
option to Step (4) and can be used to mitigate the
traffic analysis attack.
6. Similar to Step (2), the sender issues the brief mes-
sage to DS .
7. A verifier can challenge a content issued by the sender
through verifying any packet of that content. Simi-
lar to Step (3), the verify and shutoff (stop verifying)
processes may occur during content transmission. In
general, the verification request is directed toDL and
then forwarded to DS only when the verification can-
not be performed at DL. More details on the verify
and shutoff procedures are discussed in Sections 5.2
and 5.3.
8. For other requesters, if the cached verification infor-
mation is still available in DL, the verification can be
performed at the local network similar to the corre-
sponding procedures in Step (3). For a special case,
if DL or the local network caches the content, we can
still follow steps (1) - (5) to take the accountability
of the original sender at the local network.
Sender (S) Requester (R)
Packet
Verify
Result
Verify
Result
Shutoff
Verify
Result
DS DL
Brief
Figure 3: An overview of the request process.
Fig. 3 shows an overview of the request process. Given
that the Internet is divided into many geographical net-
work domains, the design of the APCN architecture can
efficiently achieve a scalable balance of accountability and
privacy in large-scale content-based networks.
4.1. Addresses
APCN adopts self-certifying address, which is similar
to the address used in the popular AIP [3] and XIP in XIA
(a typical future Internet architecture focusing on network
security) [19]. Each packet has three addresses: destina-
tion address, accountability address, and return address.
Table 2 shows different types of addresses with their for-
mats.
Each address consists of three elements: 1) a network
ID (NID) used to identify a network domain, 2) a host ID
(HID) used to represent a host, and 3) a content ID (CID)
used for the identification of different contents. The NID
and HID are generated by the hash of a public key, and
Table 2: Addresses in the Packet Header
Address
Type
Format Note
Destination
Address
NIDD : HIDD : CIDD Mandatory
Accountability
Address
NIDA : HIDA : CIDA Mandatory
Return
Address
NIDR : HIDR : CIDR Optional
the CID is explained below. It is worth noting that, al-
though NID:HID can be used to locate a unique host, the
CID is adopted for finer-grained positioning in a host. In
other words, the CID can be used to distinguish differ-
ent contents in the same host. If the application requires
ports for communication, the socket ID (SID) can be used
to replace the CID in the destination address and the re-
turn address. The SID is used at the host to demultiplex
packets to sockets [42]. These logical IDs may be sepa-
rate header fields or a combined field (e.g., an IP address
that encodes both an NID and an HID; the content can
be represented by the CID, or the port number serves as
an SID). In the following, we describe the CID in detail.
In APCN, the CID is proposed as a key element for
overcoming the limitations of the packet-based approach.
There are three goals of using the CID: 1) it is capable
of self-certifying; 2) it can effectively identify a content,
where the same content issued from a sender to different
requesters will have the identical identity, and the same
content issued by different senders will have different iden-
tities; 3) it can meet the requirements of verifying a con-
tent based on any of its packets at any time instead of
performing the verification after receiving all the packets
of a content.
In XIA, the content identifier is the cryptographic hash
of the associated content [19]. This does not fit the pro-
posed architecture because the same content sent by differ-
ent senders will have the same CID if we generate the CID
as recommended by XIA. Thus, we cannot distinguish who
should be held accountable if needed. Therefore, in APCN
the CID is more than just a simple hash of the content but
also binds the public key of the sender and the address of
the accountability delegate to the content, i.e.,
CID = H(Content‖K+sender‖(NIDA : HIDA))
where H is a cryptographically secure hash function, and ‖
represents concatenation. The accountability delegate ad-
dress (NIDA : HIDA) is used to distinguish the same con-
tent sent from different accountability domains. K+sender
/K−sender denotes the public/private key pair of the sender;
K+sender is included in the CID to distinguish the same con-
tent issued by different senders in the same accountability
domain. In addition, K+sender plays an important role in
the self-certifying process [19, 46]. The security analysis
of CID and how to implement self-certifying is presented
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in Section 6.2.
In APCN, the public/private key pair of the sender
is allowed to be generated by the sender, and then the
public key is sent to the accountability delegate. The key
pair does not require frequent replacement, and the sender
can decide when to regenerate a new key pair. If delegates
find different senders having the same public key in the
same accountability domain, they can ask these senders to
regenerate a new key pair. Otherwise, the same content
issued by different senders in this accountability domain
would have the same CID.
The CID is generated when the content is produced,
and it can uniquely identify a content. When a content
is divided into several packets for transmission, the same
CID carried in these packet headers can be used to verify
the given content at any time, without waiting for the
entire content to be received.
In APCN, a pair of NID:HID (i.e., NIDA : HIDA
and NIDD : HIDD) can be used to identify a network
flow (the definition of flow was given in Section 3), and
the CID can be used to distinguish different contents in a
flow. When a sender sends the same content to different
receivers, the CID might appear in different flows. This
allows APCN to locate the problem more accurately. For
example, when we want to stop forwarding malicious or il-
legal content, we can shutoff a content transmission rather
than a flow, unless the sender is an attacker (more details
on shutoff will be discussed in Section 5.3).
4.2. The Necessity of Using Self-Certifying Identifiers
Why is the CID designed to be self-certifying? As we
introduced in Section 2.2, the self-certifying identifier has
been considered the trend in the development of communi-
cation networks [18, 37, 46]. Therefore, in addition to NID
and HID, CID as part of the address should also be self-
certifying. Another important reason is that, although the
delegate acting as a third party can vouch for a sender or
a requester, i.e., the delegate can confirm that a requester
issues a request or a sender sends a content. However, it
is not possible for the delegate to verify that the sender
owns the content. If someone needs to confirm that the
sender is the owner of the content, the CID should have
the ability of self-certifying. We analyse the security of
CID and introduce how to implement the self-certifying
CID in Section 6.2.
4.3. Local Delegate (DL)
DL plays an important role in balancing the privacy
and accountability of the requester, which has been de-
scribed in the lifecycle of the request process (see Fig. 2).
Table 3: Cached Information in DL Used for Local Packet Verifying
CID Result (T/F) Expiration
CID1 T 30 s
CID2 F 20 s
In addition, DL is another key element in the proposed
APCN architecture that is used for reducing the delay of
packet verification through local verifying. The verifica-
tion information stored in DL includes the CID, the vali-
dation results and the expiration time. A typical example
of what is stored in DL can be found in Table 3. “T/F”
can be used as the validation result to denote whether a
delegate vouches for a packet (content). Since we do not
add a synchronous or push mechanism between DL and
DS , for security considerations, we set the expiration time
for each entry in DL [49] (setting the expiration time is dis-
cussed in Section 7.1). The expiration time can also help
decrease the negative effects when the requester would not
detect the malicious problem in time because, after the ex-
piration time, the verification information needs to be re-
acquired from DS (this is elaborated in Section 5.2). The
storage occupied by the caching verification information is
another factor required in the proposed design. If there is
insufficient space, the entry will be removed by a suitable
replacement policy, e.g., Least Recently Used (LRU).
5. The Accountability Process in APCN
This section presents how accountability is performed
in APCN. In the following, let {x}KEY indicate a signature
on x with a KEY. The KEY can be a private key or a sym-
metric key. For example, {x}K−A denotes a signature on x
with A’s private key and {x}KAB represents a signature on
x with a symmetric key shared by A and B. Let → be the
packet transmission path, e.g., A → B indicates packets
sent from A to B. For the sake of clarity of illustration, the
following abbreviations will be used throughout this sec-
tion: S denotes the Sender, R represents the Requester,
P is the Packet, H is the cryptographically secured hash
function, and MAC denotes the Message Authentication
Code.
5.1. Brief()
Brief() is the process in which S sends a brief message
to DS to notify what it has issued. Brief needs to contain
enough information to allow DS to respond to any verifi-
cation request. Each brief message includes a ClientID, a
fingerprint and a MAC using the key KSDS :
Brief(P) = ClientID‖F (P )‖MACKSDS (ClientID‖F (P ))
where ClientID is used to notify DS who sent the packet.
It could be either the sender’s HID or other identifiers
only known by DS . MAC is a tool used to ensure mes-
sage integrity. The fingerprint is used as evidence to re-
spond to the verification request. DS stores fingerprints
and determines whether the content was truly sent by S
through querying whether the corresponding fingerprint
exists. The packet fingerprint F(P) is given by
F (P ) = H(KSDS‖CID‖H(Pbody))
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where KSDS is a symmetric key which is only known by
S and DS ; it is created if DS agrees to be responsible
for S and can be replaced periodically. KSDS is included
in the fingerprint to prevent others from establishing the
association between P and F(P). It is also a measure to
protect the privacy of the senders. Pbody represents the
payload of a packet. It is included in the F(P) to meet
the requirement of verifying a content at any time based
on any packet belonging to that content.
Instead of sending full-size fingerprints, a bloom filter
can be used. Specifically, S can periodically send a bloom
filter toDS after collecting fingerprints. In this case, KSDS
is no longer needed in the fingerprint, because if we use a
bloom filter, it is difficult for an observer to know what is
contained in the fingerprint. The use of a bloom filter can
reduce the storage usage of DS and the network overhead
between S and DS , but at the same time, the false posi-
tive rate of the bloom filter is inevitable. In addition, the
expiration time of the brief message is not limited by DS .
It is worth noting that, regardless of whether the direct
transmission of fingerprints or bloom filters is used, the
delegate will not know the payload of the content issued
by the sender.
How to detect malicious behaviours in the brief
process. Malicious senders may send a flood of Briefs to
their delegate. The delegate can issue some policies to pre-
vent Brief flooding, such as using bloom filters or setting a
maximum number of Briefs received per second from the
same host. This flooding behaviour can be detected. For
example, a delegate receives numerous brief messages from
a sender, but there is no verification request sent to the
delegate to verify whether the sender has sent something.
5.2. Verify()
The purpose of Verify() is to determine whether a del-
egate is responsible for a content. A verifier can check any
received packets belonging to a content. The delegate will
check two things to achieve this purpose: 1) whether the
content was truly sent by S through checking whether the
corresponding fingerprint exists in DS or the correspond-
ing CID exists in DL, and 2) the transmission of this con-
tent has not been shutoff. If both checks are passed, the
delegate replies with a VERIFIED message. It is worth
noting that only one packet of the same content is required
to be verified because all packets of the same content carry
the same CID in their headers. Once validated, the content
is vouched for by some delegate. The verifier can maintain
a whitelist locally for recording which CID (content) has
recently been verified. We can set a duration to keep this
whitelist alive, after which the verifier needs to perform
the process of Verify() again to avoid some cases, e.g., the
sender is attacked during this period of time.
In our proposal, a verifier only needs to verify a single
packet from a piece of content, and then it whitelists all
other packets with the same CID. Under this case, what
stops an attacker from sending arbitrary packets using that
CID? Because in the brief process (see Section 5.1) the
hash of packets is sent to the delegate; the verifier can,
therefore, challenge a sender using any packet of the con-
tent. If an attacker steals the CID, the payload of that
fake packet will be incorrect. If the fake packet is used in
the verify process, it will not pass the verify. If the CID
is stolen, but the fake packet is not issued to the delegate
for verification, even if the requester receives the packet,
it still cannot be used to assemble the content. The re-
quester will ask to retransmit the packet, similar to the
current TCP/IP network.
In the Verify() process, the following three cases may
occur.
5.2.1. No validation results found at the local delegate
A verifier first enquires whether DL has a record of
verification results of a content. If no result could be found
because that content has not been requested or verified
locally or the content verification result stored locally has
expired, DL will forward the request to DS .
5.2.2. Validation results found at the local delegate
When the verification response byDS returns, DL caches
the result. If the same content is requested for verification
by other verifiers in the same accountability domain, the
verification is performed directly by DL. This greatly im-
proves the efficiency of verification and reduces the con-
sumption of network resources. If verifiers use the same
delegate with senders, the verifier can directly verify from
DS .
5.2.3. No verification information in the delegate (neither
DS nor DL)
If information used for verification cannot be found in
all delegates (including DS and DL), because the verifi-
cation information is expired, or the Briefs and validation
results are lost during transmission, we can obtain the re-
sults from the sender. In this case, DS can send a verifi-
cation request to the sender. The sender verifies whether
the content has been sent. If the sender does not support
recursive verification, or cannot confirm whether the con-
tent was sent by itself, because there might be no record in
the sender or the sender has re-generated the correspond-
ing CID, the content is not vouched for by any delegate.
In this case, the content needs to be dropped and the re-
quester can re-request it.
When a verifier sends the verify request to the delegate,
it needs to include the CID and the hash of the packet.
MAC with KV is used to ensure that the response from
the delegate is what V requests, where KV is the private
key only known by the verifier V. This process can be
expressed as
V → DS , V → DL and DL → DS :
Verify(P) = CID‖H(Pbody)‖MACKV (CID‖H(Pbody))
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If there is no verification information in the delegate,
DS sends the verification to the sender, i.e.,
DS → S : {VERIFICATION ‖CID}KSDS
where the VERIFICATION is the request sent from DS
to S. Once the verification result is obtained, the delegate
responds to the verifier via the following process.
DS → DL and DL → V :
Result(P) = {VERIFIED‖Verify(P)}K−DS
where K+DS / K
−
DS
is the public/private key pair of DS .
How to deal with a large number of verification
requests in which attacks may occur. In this process,
delegates can count where the verification requests origi-
nated. If a verifier sends a large number of duplicate ver-
ify messages (regardless of the verification interval) over a
period of time, the delegate will temporarily stop the ver-
ification request from that verifier. In addition, if a veri-
fier sends a large number of invalid verification requests,
e.g., the received verification cannot find the correspond-
ing sender in the records, delegates will check whether the
verifier is malicious or there are malicious nodes posing as
a sender in the accountability domain.
5.3. Shutoff()
When a receiver (i.e., senders or requesters) identifies
a malicious flow or content, they can stop the traffic using
Shutoff(). The shutoff message will first be sent to DL,
such as Verify(), then forwarded to DS , i.e.,
V → DL :
Shutoff(P)DL = {CID‖H(Pbody)‖duration}K−R
DL → DS :
Shutoff(P)DS = {CID‖H(Pbody)‖duration‖HIDV }K−DL
where the duration is the length of time that the delegate
stops verifying the content sent from the malicious sender;
the HIDV is the HID of the verifier who sends the shutoff,
which should be included in the shutoff message when be-
ing forwarded from DL to DS , because if malicious shutoffs
are detected, the one who sends the shutoff message could
be accountable through DL. DL also records the shutoff
request for subsequent actions.
When a sender’s delegate receives a shutoff for a par-
ticular CID, does it block all future transmissions of that
piece of content or all future transmissions from that sender?
Our suggestion is to make different decisions based on dif-
ferent circumstances. Delegates can record and count the
frequency and the number of valid shutoffs. For an occa-
sional case, e.g., only one requester sends a shutoff against
the content, we can stop the content being forwarded to
the requester who sent the shutoff message. If a content
is reported as malicious by many requesters, we can stop
forwarding that content in the network. When a sender
issues considerable malicious contents, it is necessary to
prevent the sender from sending packets for a period of
time and even address the sender’s legal responsibilities.
Whether to respond to the shutoff instruction.
It is optional for the delegate to respond to the shutoff in-
struction. Our suggestion is that if the shutoff is success-
ful, the delegate needs to respond. Otherwise, the delegate
can ignore such an instruction, or punish the verifier who
sent a malicious shutoff. If the verifier does not receive a
response within a pre-defined threshold, for example, due
to the loss of shutoff messages during transmission, it can
re-send the shutoff to the delegate.
5.4. Theoretical Analysis
In this section, an elegant analytical model is derived
to analyse the efficiency of APCN compared with a packet-
based (PKT) architecture. In APCN, we allow the same
content acquired by multiple requesters to use the same
validation message. This means that we can detect prob-
lems early, and then perform shutoff or accountability ac-
tions. Fig. 4 shows the difference in the accountability
processes between APCN and the PKT architecture.
Sender (S) Requester (R)
Packet
Verify
Result
Verify
Result
Verify
Shutoff
Shutoff
Verify
Verify
Result
APIP
APCN
Difference between APIP and APCN
DS DL
Figure 4: The comparison of accountability process between APCN
and the PKT architecture.
5.4.1. The delay in the accountability process
The delay of the verify process in the PTK architecture
can be expressed as
DPKT =
∑
i∈V
RDS ,iPDS
where RDS ,i denotes the RTT between the i -th verifier and
DS , and PDS is the probability of finding the verification
information at DS . V represents the set of verifiers.
In APCN, if the verification information is cached in
DL, the delay can be given by
DAPCNDL =
∑
i∈V
RDL,iPDL
where RDL,i denotes the RTT between the i -th verifier and
DL, and PDL is the probability of finding the verification
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information at DL. If no verification information is found
in DL, the delay will be:
DAPCNDS =
∑
i∈V
RDS ,i(1− PDL)PDS , (RDS ,i ≥ RDL,i)
and the reduced RTT can be given by
∆DAPCN =
∑
i∈V
RDL,iPDL −
∑
i∈V
RDS ,iPDLPDS
5.4.2. Reduced access burden to the source delegate
Let Ntotal denotes the total number of requests (in-
cluding verify and shutoff requests), and NDL represents
the number of requests received at DL. With the proposed
APCN, the cache hit rate of DS can be reduced by
ϕ =
Ntotal −NDL
Ntotal
=
∑
i∈V Reqi(1− PDL)∑
i∈V Reqi
= 1− PDL
where Reqi denotes the request issued by the i -th verifier.
Through theoretical analysis, we find that APCN can
reduce the RTT of packet verification and relieve the access
burden to the delegate DS .
5.4.3. Analysis of Space Complexity and Time Complexity
In this section, we analyse the space complexity and
the time complexity of the proposed APCN.
Space complexity. Using the proposed APCN ar-
chitecture, the maximum communication overhead, which
involves verification information delivery, is no more than
Totalmessage(∆t):
Totalmessage(∆t) = m× n× (δ + δ) = 2mnδ
where m represents the number of requesters (network
users), and n denotes the request rate of a requester. δ
denotes the cost of storing a piece of verification informa-
tion in a given time window (∆t). Since there are two
delegates in the accountability process (i.e., DL and DS ),
and each of them needs to store one copy, therefore two
δ are needed. The space complexity of the PKT archi-
tecture is mnδ because the verification information in the
PKT architecture only needs to be stored in the DS .
Time complexity. In the proposed APCN architec-
ture, the worst scenario is that there is no verification in-
formation in both DL and DS , and the verify message
needs to be sent to the sender for verification (more details
of this process can be found in Section 5.2.3). Therefore,
the total time complexity of the accountability process in
a given time window (∆t) is no more than Totaltime(∆t):
Totaltime(∆t) = O(n
3)
However, in most cases, verifiers can obtain the verification
results from the DL (Section 7 addresses this argument).
Even if the verifier needs to obtain the verification result
from DS , the time complexity is O(n
2). The time com-
plexity of the PKT architecture is O(n2). Because in the
PKT architecture, verification information is sent directly
to the DS , and then sent to the sender if there is no result
in the DS .
6. Security Analysis in Real-world Deployment
In this section, a list of possible security problems that
may be encountered in the real-world deployment of the
proposed architecture and their countermeasures are anal-
ysed.
6.1. The Duty of Accountability Delegates
The delegate has three basic responsibilities in APCN:
1) protecting the privacy of their clients, 2) verifying pack-
ets via fingerprints or cached verification information, and
realizing the accountability to their clients, and 3) drop-
ping (stopping verifying) invalid or malicious packets if
needed.
Recall that the delegate is assumed to be honest-but-
curious in the above-mentioned design. However, what is
harmful if the delegate is no longer trusted? Client pri-
vacy may be released, and the verification function may
not be performed, or the incorrect verification results may
be sent. Thus, the delegate cannot take the role of account-
ability, and the clients can decide to replace the delegate
and take legal measures to punish the delegates [6, 39].
In APCN, multiple delegates can be adopted in each
accountability domain; the client can then randomly select
a delegate or choose one based on the credibility of the
delegates to reduce the risk of victimization. In addition,
a Registry can be used in our architecture to be responsible
for generating, distributing, and managing the client’s real
identity. A client ID can be generated by the hash of the
sender’s public key and a random number (i.e., nonce):
Client ID = H(K+sender‖nonce).
3
Client
Registry Delegate
Figure 5: The relationships between Client, Delegate, and Registry.
The relationships between the Client (e.g., requesters,
senders), the Delegate, and the Registry are shown in Fig.
5, and their interactions can be described as follows:
1. A client registers a client ID with the registry. Only
the registry knows the mapping between the client
ID and the client’s identity. Since the registry does
not participate in the accountability process (see Sec-
tion 5), it does not know the behaviour of the client.
2. The clients send brief messages to the delegate as we
described in step (2) of Fig. 2. More details of the
brief process can be found in Section 5.1.
3. When a client becomes a malicious node and needs
to be punished, delegates need to cooperate with the
registry to identify the real identity of a client.
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Thus, delegates do not learn the real identity of a client,
because the client ID is only a flexible and replaceable alias
of a client. It can replace the HID in the packet header
when a client sends brief messages to the delegate. Even if
the delegate is attacked, it will not result in the disclosure
of client privacy. Only when a delegate cooperates with a
registry, can the delegate completely learn exactly which
client has communicated with whom. However, even the
delegate and the registry can be attacked, in which case
the attacker still cannot obtain what (packet payloads)
the client has issued, as the delegate only stores client be-
haviours rather than the packet payloads. Therefore, the
design of the registry decentralizes the delegate’s rights,
and this decentralized design helps to improve the secu-
rity and reliability of the proposed architecture [2, 32].
6.2. The Security of the Content ID (CID)
We described why CID is designed to be self-certifying
in Section 4.2. Self-certifying means that an entity (e.g.,
requester or sender) claims to have an identity (e.g., CID),
and other entities can verify whether the identity belongs
to the claimant without third-party participation. Because
the sender’s public key and the address of the delegate are
available, anyone can verify the authenticity of the CID
after receiving the content. In addition, if a node disguises
the sender, it can also be discovered by the following steps:
1. The verifier sends a random nonce N to the one that
declares itself to be the sender (requester or content
owner).
2. The sender encrypts the random nonce N using its
private key, and then sends the encrypted N along
with its public key to the verifier if the verifier does
not have the public key.
3. The verifier decrypts the encrypted random number
N using the public key and determines whether the
random number N is what it sent to the sender.
The verifier can then calculate whether the hash of the
content, the sender’s public key and the delegate’s address
are equal to the CID (i.e., H(Content‖K+sender‖(NIDA :
HIDA)) = CID). In this process, the content is what the
verifier receives, the accountability address (i.e., NIDA :
HIDA) is in the packet header, and the public key is just
verified.
6.3. Leaking Privacy by Logs
In the proposed APCN architecture, when a requester
sends a request to a sender (i.e., the content owner), the
source address in the packet header is the requester’s dele-
gate address (i.e., requester’s accountability address). There-
fore, the log analysis can only learn that there exists a
communication between two accountability domains, with-
out learning which node makes/receives the communica-
tion unless there is only one node in each domain.
6.4. How to Deal with a Replay Attack
In the existing packet-based architecture, a fingerprint
is a function of the sender, the receiver, and the data,
while in APCN it only depends on the sender and the
data. Once a sender sends a brief to its delegate for a
particular piece of content, an attacker might replay any
packet from that content to other nodes in the network. In
this case, the victim sends a shutoff message to inform the
local delegate which CID has been used by the attacker.
Because the shutoff message is sent to the local delegate
in the first instance (then forwarded to the source del-
egate), when subsequent packets of the malicious content
(used for attack) enter the local accountability domain, the
delegates stop vouching for that content, and the routers
stop forwarding that content; the attack will eventually be
blocked. It is worth noting that shutoff does not affect the
normal communication of both sides, i.e., the sender can
still transmit other contents to the requester. However,
in the existing packet-based architecture, if the receiver
(content requester) sends a shutoff message to the sender’s
delegate, the other packets from the sender to the receiver
(i.e., the specific flow) will be blocked. As a result, the
sender will not be able to send other contents to the re-
ceiver for a period of time. In other words, it will affect
the normal transmission of other contents, especially when
a flow contains multiple contents.
7. Performance Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, extensive simulation experiments are
conducted to validate the effectiveness and evaluate the
performance of the proposed APCN architecture. In par-
ticular, we compare the performance of APCN with that
of a packet-based architecture (PKT) [39] to show its rela-
tive merits. To achieve this purpose, we develop a discrete-
event simulator based on the NS-3 simulation framework
[21] and implement both the APCN and the PKT archi-
tectures. Table 4 shows the key system parameter settings
in the simulation environment.
To evaluate the effect of different parameters on per-
formance, we change the number of content from 10,000 to
60,000 in Section 7.2 and set α (Zipf distribution parame-
ter) from 0.7 to 1.3 in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4, we vary
the cache size in delegates. We increase the request rate
of the requesters from 25 to 150 in Section 7.5. In Section
7.6, we vary the number of requesters. In Section 7.7, we
change the distance between DS and DL by changing the
link delay. We introduce the changes in the parameters
in each subsection. If there is no particular highlight, the
default parameter settings in Table 4 will be used.
The same topology used in Fig. 2 is adopted in the sim-
ulation environment. The topology of the China Science
and Technology Network (CSTNet), a small Internet ser-
vice provider with more than 400 nodes is used to simulate
the local network. A core router of CSTNet is selected as
DL, and the 345 leaf routers act as clients/requesters. We
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collect the network data from a border router of CSTNet
to investigate the performance of the APCN and the PKT
architectures. This one-hour trace was taken on August
13, 2013 at noon, from 11:00 to 12:00. It contains 463.22
million flows. The system parameters are set based on the
existing studies [15, 26] and real-world measurements. In
the local network, the link delay is set to 1 ms because
according to our measurement, the average delay from the
requesters to DL is 2.57 ms and the average number of
hops from the requesters to DL is 2.48 hops. The request
rate is set to 50 requests/s [26]. The dataset comes from a
SIGCOMM paper [15], which contains more than 100,000
objects, and the request rate distribution follows Zipf’s
law [7]. Given that the exponent parameter of the Zipf
distribution is 0.99 in the United States, 0.92 in Europe,
and 1.04 in Asia [15], in this paper, we chose 1.0 as the
default value.
Table 4: The System Parameters Setting
Parameter Value
Number of requesters
(clients)
345
Link delay between DS and
DL
3 ms/hop × 10 hops =
30 ms
Forwarding strategy Best Route
Replacement Least Recently Used
(LRU)
Payload 1,024 Bytes
Link bandwidth at local net-
works
100 Mbps
Link bandwidth between DS
and DL
1,000 Mbps
Max packets for transmission
queue on the link (both direc-
tions)
10,000 packets
Number of content 100,000
Cache size in delegates 100,000 packets
Link delay of connections at
local networks (link delay be-
tween clients)
1 ms
The request rate 50 requests/s
Request packet size 31 Bytes
Zipf (q, α) (0, 1.0)
Simulation time 600 s
The hop count and link delay between DS and DL
can reflect the distance between them. To have reason-
able settings of link variables (e.g., delay), we made some
real-world measurements. A measurement result reveals
that the RTT between Beijing and a site in a university in
Kaifeng that is approximately 600 kilometres away from
Beijing is 32 ms. Another measurement result shows that
the RTT between Beijing and a farther site in Hong Kong
is 169 ms. Based on these results, the delay between DS
and DL is initially set to 30 ms. The effects of varying
distances between DS and DL are evaluated in Section
7.7.
We conducted experiments to investigate the effects
of different settings of the expiration time of the verifica-
tion information stored in the delegate on network perfor-
mance, and found that with the expiration time exceeding
30 s, the network performance will not have significant
improvement (see Section 7.1). Therefore, the expiration
time of verification information in DL is set to 30 s in the
simulation.
Two key performance metrics are adopted to evaluate
the performance of these architectures: reduced RTT ra-
tio and cache hit rate. The reduced RTT ratio represents
the effect of the reduced RTT in the accountability pro-
cess when using the proposed APCN compared with that
when using the PKT architecture. The cache hit rate is
the probability of successfully finding the verification infor-
mation at DL, reflecting the effect of relieving the burden
of accessing DS and reducing the bandwidth consumption
between the two delegates - DL and DS . These two per-
formance metrics can be expressed as follows:
Reduced RTT Ratio =
RTT pkt −RTT apcn
RTT pkt
Cache Hit Rate =
Nhit
Nhit +Nmiss
where RTT pkt and RTT apcn are the average RTTs for
the accountability process under the PKT and the APCN
architectures, respectively. Nhit is the number of packets
successfully verified at DL, and Nmiss is the number of
packets that do not find the verification information at
DL.
7.1. Effects of the Expiration Time of Verification Infor-
mation Cached in the Delegates
To investigate the effects of the expiration time of the
cache entries in the delegate, Fig. 6 depicts the perfor-
mance results between APCN and the PKT architecture
against the varying expiration time under different num-
bers of contents. Fig. 6(a) shows the reduced RTT ratio
(recall that the reduced RTT ratio reflects the performance
improvement due to the use of APCN compared with the
PKT architecture), and Fig. 6(b) depicts the cache hit
rate of DL, which reflects the effect of relieving the access
burden on DS .
From the figure, we find that with the increase in the
expiration time, network performance improves, since both
the reduced RTT ratio and the cache hit rate increase.
The increase in the cache hit rate means that more ver-
ify() procedures are performed at the local delegate, DL,
resulting in reduced access to the source delegate, DS . As
the number of content increases, network performance de-
grades. We will explain this phenomenon and discuss the
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Figure 6: Effects of expiration time of cache entry in delegates: (a)
reduced RTT ratio and (b) cache hit rate.
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Figure 7: Effects of the number of content: (a) reduced RTT ratio
and (b) cache hit rate.
effects of the number of content in Section 7.2. From Fig.
6, we also find that, when the expiration time increases,
the performance improvement due to the use of APCN
slows down, especially when the expiration time exceeds
30 s because, with the growth of the expiration time, the
frequency of retrieving verification information from DS is
reduced, i.e., the negative effects of the expiration time are
gradually reduced. This investigation demonstrates that
the expiration time of the verification cache entry can be
appropriately pre-determined with the given system set-
tings.
7.2. Effects of the Number of Content
In Section 7.1, we compared the effects of the expira-
tion time of the cache entry under different numbers of
content (i.e., 100,000, 150,000 and 200,000). It can be ob-
served that there is a slight decrease in the network perfor-
mance when the number of content increases. To evaluate
the effect of the number of content, Fig. 7 depicts the per-
formance metrics against the varying number of content
from 100,000 to 600,000. The other parameters are un-
changed and are the default values, i.e., the expiration time
of the cache entry is 30 s, the parameter of the Zipf distri-
bution is 1.0, and the client request rate is 50 requests/s.
We can see that with the increase in the number of content,
the performance of APCN compared with the PKT archi-
tecture has significant improvement. For example, when
the number of content is 300,000, the reduced RTT ratio
is 72.02%, and the cache hit rate in the DL is 82.76%.
In addition, the effect of performance improvement due to
the use of APCN is gradually reduced. Specifically, when
the number of content increases from 300,000 to 600,000,
the reduced RTT ratio drops from 72.02% to 67.87%, and
the cache hit rate drops from 82.76% to 78.59% because,
with the increase in the number of content, the number of
times accessing DS to obtain the verification information
also increases.
These results mean that if the number of clients (re-
questers) and the request rate of each client remains con-
stant, the performance of the proposed APCN relative to
the PKT architecture has significant improvement, but the
effect of performance improvement is gradually reduced if
the number of content increases. In reality, with the in-
crease in the number of content, the number of clients and
the request rate should grow rapidly [11]. The merits of
the proposed APCN architecture are more apparent if the
client’s request rate or the number of clients increases (see
Section 7.5 and Section 7.6).
7.3. Effects of the Content Popularity
In this section, we consider the Zipf distribution for
content popularity (i.e., different distributions of the con-
tent request) [38], as it has been widely used in related
studies for this purpose. In the Zipf distribution, q denotes
the parameter of rank, and α represents the value of the
exponent characterizing the distribution. To investigate
the effects of content popularity, we set the parameters of
the Zipf distribution as follows: q = 0 and α = 0.7, 0.8,
0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. With q = 0, the increase in α
represents the increase in the concentration of the request.
Fig. 8 shows the improvement of APCN compared with
the PKT architecture against the varying α when the re-
quest rate is 50, and the number of content is 100,000.
From the figure, we find that with the increase in the pa-
rameter α, the performance of the proposed architecture
improves, as the reduced RTT ratio and cache hit rate
increase significantly. Specifically, as the value of α in-
creases from 0.7 to 1.3, the reduced RTT ratio increases
from 77.57% to 83.39%, and the cache hit rate in DL in-
creases from 85.21% to 95.52% because more verify() re-
quests can be performed at DL in the local network before
the verification information expires. In other words, the
accountability for those contents is promptly verified lo-
cally. In the real world, the higher the popularity of the
content, the higher the frequency and the larger number
of verification requests that are processed at DL.
7.4. Effects of the Delegate Cache Ability
In this section, we change the cache size in the dele-
gates to assess the impact of caching ability on network
performance. The cache ability is defined as follows:
Cache Ability =
Scache
Ncontent
where Scache represents the cache size in the delegates, and
Ncontent denotes the number of content.
From Fig. 9(a) we see that when the cache ability
is more than 50%, the growth of the cache ability does
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Figure 8: Effects of content popularity: (a) reduced RTT ratio and
(b) cache hit rate.
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Figure 9: Effects of delegate cache ability: (a) reduced RTT ratio and
cache hit rate and (b) requirement of cache ability.
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Figure 10: Effects of the number of content and cache size in delegates: (a) reduced RTT ratio and (b) cache hit
rate.
not affect the performance improvement. When the cache
ability is set as 70% (e.g., the cache size is 70,000 packets)
or higher, increasing the cache size no longer affects the
results - the reduced RTT ratio is 78.67% and the cache
hit rate is 89.34% - because under the current parame-
ter settings, if the cache capacity is less than 70%, the
delegates will use the LRU replacement policy to remove
some cached verification information to meet the storage
limitation. However, when the cache ability of the dele-
gate reaches 70%, the storage space is not a constraint,
because the cached verification information will be invalid
(expiration) before needing to be deleted for new entries.
In addition, we evaluate the cache ability requirements
to deal with the growth of content. Fig. 9(b) depicts the
cache ability against the varying number of content. The
results show that when the number of content increases,
the need for cache ability decreases gradually. This means
that the delegate’s cache ability growth rate should be
lower than the growth rate of the number of content. Re-
flecting real-world deployment, when the number of con-
tent increases dramatically, the storage capacity of the del-
egates does not need to have the same growth rate.
We also evaluate the effect of the delegate cache ability
by simultaneously changing the number of content and the
cache size in the delegates. In this evaluation, the number
of content, and the cache size in delegates increase from
100,000 to 500,000, respectively. Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b)
show that when the cache size is at a high level, continuing
to increase the cache size does not significantly increase the
reduced RTT ratio and the cache hit rate because in this
case, the cache size is sufficient for storing verification in-
formation for popular content (content popularity follows
the Zipf distribution). For example, when the number
of content is 500,000, and the cache size is 100,000, the
reduced RTT ratio is 68.92%, and the cache hit rate is
79.65%. When the cache size increases to 200,000 and the
number of content remains at 500,000, the reduced RTT
ratio is 68.94%, and the cache hit rate is 79.68%. The
result reflects the same conclusion as Fig. 9(b), i.e., with
the increase in the number of content, the cache ability of
the delegates is not required to have the same growth rate
to meet the needs of caching verification information.
In addition, from Fig. 10 we also see that along with
the increase in the number of content, both the reduced
RTT ratio, and the cache hit rate decrease slowly, which
is also consistent with the results reflected in Fig. 7.
7.5. Effects of the Request Rate
To evaluate the effect of the request rate, Fig. 11 de-
picts the reduced RTT ratio and the cache hit rate against
the varying request rates of each requester from 25 to 150.
We observe that when the request rate increases, the ef-
ficiency and advantage of our architecture is more obvi-
ous. Specifically, when the request rate is 25 requests/s,
the reduced RTT ratio is 74.4%, and the cache hit rate
is 84.98%. If the request rate increases to 150 requests/s,
the reduced RTT ratio increases to 83.76%, and the cache
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Figure 11: Effects of request rate of requesters: (a) reduced RTT ratio
and (b) cache hit rate.
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Figure 12: Effects of the number of requesters: (a) reduced RTT and
(b) cache hit rate.
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Figure 13: Effects of different topologies and different content popu-
larity: (a) reduced RTT ratio and (b) cache hit rate.
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Figure 14: Effects of different topologies and different request rates:
(a) reduced RTT ratio and (b) cache hit rate.
hit rate reaches 94.57%. In addition, with the continu-
ously increasing request rate, the performance improve-
ment will stabilize (i.e., the growth becomes slower) be-
cause the more frequent the client requests content, the
more verifies that will be done in the local delegate. In re-
ality, with the rapid development of the Internet, the fre-
quency of clients requesting content also rapidly increases
[11].
7.6. Effects of the Number of Requesters
To evaluate the impact of the number of requesters, in
this section we randomly select some requesters from all
345 clients acting as active clients to request contents. At
the same time, the other clients do not request content
temporarily. This will ensure that we can do this assess-
ment without changing the network topology. The number
of active clients divided by the total number of clients is
called the client activity rate, i.e.,
Client Activity Rate =
Nactive
Nclient
where Nactive represents the number of active clients, and
Nclient denotes the number of clients in the network.
In this section, we randomly select 34, 86, 172, 259
and 345 active clients, representing the client activity rate
as 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%, respectively. Fig. 12
shows the performance results. The results demonstrate
that with the same network topology, the more requesters
that are in the system, the better our architecture performs
(compared with the PKT architecture). For example, if
the client activity rate is 10%, i.e., there are only 34 nodes
requesting content, the reduced RTT ratio is 65.38%, and
the cache hit rate is 74.32%. When the client activity
rate increases to 50%, i.e., 172 requesters in the network,
the reduced RTT ratio increases to 75.91%, and the cache
hit rate reaches 89.34%. That means, with the increase in
the number of requesters, the performance of the proposed
APCN architecture is superior to that of the PKT archi-
tecture. In addition, with the constantly increasing num-
ber of requesters, the performance improvement of APCN
slows down, since the reduced RTT ratio and cache hit
rate increase smoothly because along with the increase in
the number of requesters, more requests, therefore, tar-
get new content that local requesters have not recently
requested. As a result, the access to the source delegate
(DS) to obtain the verify results will increase.
We also evaluate the effect of changing network topolo-
gies on network performance. We choose two topologies
(GlobeNet and ATMnet) from The Internet Topology Zoo
[27], where GlobeNet includes 67 nodes, and ATMnet has
21 nodes. The two topologies are used as local networks.
Figs. 13 and 14 show the effect of varying content pop-
ularities and request rates of the requesters on network
performance. From these two figures, we see that as the
number of nodes (requesters) increases in the topology, our
architecture is more efficient than the PKT architecture
(reflected by a higher reduced RTT ratio and increased
cache hit rate). This conclusion is consistent with the re-
sults shown in Fig. 12. In that evaluation, we did not
change the topology and only changed the number of users
by randomly selecting different numbers of requesters to
act as active clients. In addition, Fig. 13(a) shows that
as the value of α increases from 0.7 to 1.3, the reduced
RTT ratios for both topologies (i.e., GlobeNet and ATM-
net) tend to be identical. The cache hit rate depicted in
Fig. 13(b) shows a similar phenomenon. This is because
15
30 60 90 120 150 180
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Link Delay (ms)
(a)
R
ou
n
d
T
ri
p
T
im
e
(m
s)
PKT
APCN
30 60 90 120 150 180
0
20
40
60
80
100
Link Delay (ms)
(b)
C
a
ch
e
H
it
R
a
te
(%
)
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RTT and (b) cache hit rate.
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Figure 16: (a) Effects of whitelist size in PKT and APCN, and (b)
effects of cache size in DL.
as α increases, the content requested by the requester will
be more concentrated, i.e., more requests are initiated for
popular content. As a result, more verification is per-
formed at the local network. Therefore, the scale of the
topology has less influence on network performance when
α reaches a certain threshold.
7.7. Effects of the Distance Between DS and DL
In this section, we investigate the effect of the distance
between DS and DL on network performance by changing
the link delay between DS and DL from 30 ms to 180 ms
to represent different distances in reality. Fig. 15 depicts
the performance metrics against the varying distances be-
tween DS and DL. Fig. 15(a) shows that with the increase
in the distance, the performance improvement due to the
use of APCN is more obvious since the difference of RTT
between the PKT architecture and the APCN increases
significantly. However, with the increase in the distance,
the cache hit rate slightly decreases, which is shown in
Fig. 15(b), because if the verification information cached
in the local delegate expires, it requires a longer time to
reacquire the verification information from the remote DS .
During this period, DL could not provide such a verifica-
tion. Thus, as the distance between delegates grows, this
effect becomes more apparent. For example, if the link
delay between the sender and the requester accountability
domains is set to 90 ms, the RTT in APCN is reduced by
83.27% compared with that in the PKT architecture. At
the same time, 89.13% verification requests will be per-
formed at the local network (i.e., requester accountability
domain).
7.8. Effects of the Whitelist Size and Cache Size
For the sake of comparing with the PKT architecture,
in this section, we assume one flow transmits one content in
the network [9]. This consideration reflects the worst case
on the overhead of the proposed APCN and the general
case of the PKT architecture (i.e., different flows generate
different verification information), since in realistic scenar-
ios multiple flows may transmit the same content. In ad-
dition, because both the PKT architecture and the APCN
generate fingerprints based on packets, this consideration
makes the cost of storage and bandwidth consumption in
the Brief() process the same. Recall that each ID (e.g.,
CID) is 20 bytes since SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1)
produces 20-byte digests. The proposed APCN only needs
to record the CID in the whitelist, but the PKT architec-
ture needs to record two addresses, i.e., the destination
address and accountability address (120 bytes) [39]. Thus,
the whitelist used in APCN is much smaller than that of
the PKT architecture. Fig. 16(a) quantitatively shows
the storage cost of the whitelist in the PKT architecture
and the APCN where the whitelist size is calculated based
on both the maximum and the average number of flows
against the given verification interval. From the figure, we
can find that when the verification interval is 30 s, the pro-
posed APCN only requires 101 MB to store the whitelist,
while the PKT architecture needs 610 MB. When the inter-
val is set to 60 s, 178 MB is sufficient to store the whitelist
in APCN, but the PKT architecture requires 1.04 GB.
Caching verification information in DL is the overhead
introduced in APCN compared with the PKT architecture.
The costs required to store the verification information in
DL will be investigated as follows. Because CID requires
up to 20 bytes, and the fields for verification information
and the expiration time require up to 5 bytes [48], each
entry cached in DL requires 25 bytes in storage space. Fig.
16(b) depicts the required cache size against the expiration
time of each entry. From the figure, we find that even when
the expiration time is set to 60 s, it requires only 222 MB
storage space to cache the verification information. If the
expiration time is set to 30 s, 127 MB of storage space is
sufficient to store all verification information.
In summary, the results in this section have shown that
APCN outperforms the PKT architecture in terms of lower
RTT and a higher cache hit rate under different network
configurations. In our experiments, the RTT in APCN
could be reduced by 78.67% compared with the packet-
based architecture; meanwhile, 89.34% of the verification
could be performed at the local network. In addition, the
proposed APCN architecture can reduce the overhead of
network storage. In the evaluation, our experiments sug-
gested that when the expiration time of the cache entry is
set to 30 s, the size of a key design element, the whitelist,
maintained in the verifier dramatically decreased in APCN
(101 MB) in contrast to the one (610 MB) needed in the
packet-based architecture; moreover, the cache size in the
local delegate was maintained at an acceptable level of ap-
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proximately 127 MB.
8. Conclusions and Discussions
In this paper, we proposed the first scalable architec-
ture for balancing Accountability and Privacy in large-
scale Content-based Networks, called APCN. A separate
delegate was adopted to be responsible for the accountabil-
ity of packets, and meanwhile, protect the privacy of both
senders and requesters. In addition, a double-delegate
scheme was proposed to improve the performance and al-
leviate the scalability issue in large-scale networks, and
the newly introduced local delegate was used for the pri-
vacy protection of requesters. Furthermore, a new content
identification was proposed to identify and trace a con-
tent. The security of the proposed APCN architecture in
the real-world deployment was analysed. The proposed
APCN was designed at the network layer, which makes it
more effective than designs at other layers.
We developed a discrete-event simulator based on the
NS-3 framework and collected the real trace from an In-
ternet service provider to validate the effectiveness and
evaluate the performance of the proposed APCN. Exten-
sive simulation experiments were conducted to compare
the performance of the proposed APCN with that of the
packet-based architecture. It is worth noting that deploy-
ment of the APCN does not mean that all network users
should use the proposed architecture whenever they use
the network. When users need to protect their privacy
in content delivery scenarios, they can choose to use the
APCN architecture. The proposed architecture can be in-
stalled as a protocol in routers and can be incrementally
deployed. We will explore other architectures for balanc-
ing accountability and privacy based on flow level and ser-
vice level, respectively. Users can, therefore, choose to use
different protocols such as flow-based, content-based, and
service-based architectures in different scenarios.
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